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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Action for damages, injunctive relief, and attorney's 
fees for alleged violation of respondent's lease. 
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT 
The jury rendered a verdict in favor of respondent and 
against appellant for damages in the amount of $65,000. 
After the verdict and judgment thereon, the trial judge, 
Honorable Bryant H. Croft, denied respondent's motions for 
injunctive relief and for attorney's fees. Denials of these 
motions by the lower court are the subject of appellant's 
appeal, No. 16601. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirrnance of said judgment of $65,000 
in favor of respondent, or reversed for new trial should the 
court hold the evidence insufficient. 
In respondent's own appeal, No. 16601, presented by 
separate brief, Penelko, Inc. seeks the reversal of the 
lower court's orders denying appellant injunctive relief 
and attorney's fees. 
1 
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MATERIAL FACTS OF THE CASE 
Respondent controverts appellant's statement of 
facts for the reason that appellant's purported facts are 
so replete with misstatements and omissions that they give 
an erroneous picture of the facts in this case. Appel-
lant also fails to recognize that as the facts were found 
by the jury in favor of respondent, respondent's evidence 
must be accepted and all inferences from the evidence 
drawn in favor of respondent. Consequently, respondent, 
pursuant to Rule 75(p), Subdivision (2), states the facts 
as it finds them. 
Respondent, Penelko, Inc. is a corporation. One-
third of its stock is owned by E. Glen Koplin (Director 
and President), and Carley P. Koplin (Director). Another 
third is owned by Roger Peterson (Director and Vice-Presi-
dent), and his wife, Lavon Peterson (Director). The 
remaining third is owned by Doyle Nelson (Director and 
Secretary-Treasurer) , and his wife Charlene Nelson (Direc-
tor). (1708) 
1. The Lease Sued Upon 
On March 25, 1972, the respondent and C. F. Malstrom 
and Alvin E. Malstrom (the Malstroms were defendants 
below} entered into a lease aareement, which is the subject 
of the Complaint; a cO?Y of the lease agreement is attached 
as Exhibit "A" to the Complaint and another copy was 
2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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introduced in evidence as Exh. 1-P. The lease term was for 
twenty years. Pagagraph 15 provides for successive renew-
als of five (5) years each, making a total term of forty 
(40) years. 
The lease covers a piece of land 120 feet deep and 
70 feet wide, which fronts on 9400 South and on 700 East. 
Paragraph 3 of the lease also allots respondent 
parking space, namely a strip of land 70 feet in width and 
234 feet in depth, running from the south side of the 
east parcel proper to the north side of 9400 South Street. 
This parking strip fronts on 9400 South and adjoins the 
Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant on the east. It is the 
leased parking space upon which appellant landscaped, 
built a roadway and erected a flagpole in defiance of 
Penelko's lease. The exhibits show this leased parking 
space and "improvements" of appellant in part. (12-P, 14-P, 
15-P, 19-P) 
Paragraph 3 of respondent's lease also provides an 
additional tract for parking 11 40 feet in width and 162 
feet in depth" on the west side of the leased property 
proper. 
Paragraph 9 of the lease provides that the lessor 
shall exert his best efforts to form an association of 
lessees for the purpose of promoting the general welfare 
of lessees within the shopping center. Respondent exerted 
3 
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its best efforts, but no association of lessees was ever 
formed. ( 176 6 , 1737 - 1738) 
Paragraph 6 of the lease provides respondent may 
maintain signs and particularly "one lighted sign" in 
front of the leased premises (9400 South) but no nearer 
to 9400 South than Albertson's sign. Paragraph 6 also 
provides that upon formation of a merchant's association, 
signs should be replaced and erected "in conformance with 
rules and regulations of such association". As mentioned 
above, no association was ever formed. 
Paragraph 7 of respondent's lease contains restric-
tions on the lessors (Malstroms) in leases of property 
adjoining respondent's leased property. 
Respondent regards paragraph 7 of the lease most 
relevant to this cause, it is set out in full below: 
All parking facilities, lighting facilities and 
open spaces upon the leased premises are to be 
used in common with other occupants of property 
of the lessor for the maintenance and develop-
ment of a shopping center and no barriers shall 
be constructed or permitted which will bar access 
to such parking facilities and access roads by 
tenants of other premises or their customers or 
guests. The lessor shall provide in leases of 
adjoining property similar covenants and agree-
ments so that the lessee shall have similar 
unobstructed access to parking, lightincr and 
other coI!linon facilities of adjoining tenants. 
(our emphasis) 
2. Respondent's Construction of the Chantel Theatre, 
Erection of Theater Sign, Installation of 
Parking Lights 
From 1972 (execution of respondent's lease) to 1973 
respondent constructed the Chantel Theatre on the leased 
4 
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premises. Substantially and physically, the owners of the 
corporation constructed the theater. Glen Koplin, Presi-
dent of respondent, is a mason contractor; Roger Peterson, 
Vice-President of respondent, is a drywall contractor and 
plasterer; Doyle Nelson, Secretary-Treasurer of respondent, 
is an electronics worker. (1708) 
In 1973, following construction of the Chantel Theatre, 
respondent established entrance, parking, lighting, and 
erected the theater sign. The theater sign, is appropriately 
called a marquee, in that it has lights showing the attrac-
tion at the theater each day. The sign was approximately 
8 feet by 12 feet on a pole 10 feet above the ground. It had 
letters on both sides of it, and was placed in an east-west 
direction so that it could be seen from the traffic flow, 
both east and west. (1708 - 1714) 
In 1973 approval of the theater construction, sign 
placement and the lights was made by the Malstrorns (lessors), 
by Sandy City, and by Albertson's. Upon these approvals, 
the Chantel Theatre opened for business in June, 1973. 
(1715 - 1716) 
3. Appellant's Threat That There Were Ways of 
Acquirina a Business Other Than Buyinq it 
In or about January, 1975, Penelko's officers, E. Glen 
Koplin, Carley Koplin, and Doyle Nelson had a meeting with 
John Price. At this meeting, Price told respondent's 
officers that the Malstroms had now leased the property to 
Price and there was no place for the theater and it would 
5 
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have to be purchased by Price or relocated. It didn't look 
like it could be relocated at all on that property. Price 
made an unacceptable offer and he told the respondent's 
officers that there are other ways to get a business if we 
want to. "We can build around you", "box you in", "so 
that people can't see that you are there". (1738 - 1740, 
1943 - 1944, 2030 - 2317) 
Thereafter there was litigation by Malstroms to 
attempt to evict respondent which ended in execution of an 
addendum to the lease sued upon, dated July 1, 1977, 
mentioned below. Pagagraph 4 of the addendum provides that 
both Malstroms as lessors are in full compliance with all 
provisions of the lease sued upon. 
4. Leases and Contracts Subsequent to Opening of 
Chantel Theatre 
After respondent opened its Chantel Theatre in June, 
1973, the parties entered into the following leases and 
contracts. 
a. On March 25, 1975, Malstroms and Price Rentals, 
Inc. entered into an "Offer to Lease", dated March 27, 
1975, which covered the property on which the Perkins' Cake 
& Steak Restaurant was located. The Offer was personally 
guaranteed by John Price. (Exh. 8-P, 1789, 1890) 
b. On April 4, 1977, Price Rentals, Inc. entered into 
a contract with Jack L. Kerbs, Inc. for construction of 
the Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant. (Exh. 11-P) 
6 
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c. On December 20, 1976, Price Rentals, Inc. leased 
to Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant the property on which 
the restaurant was located. Price Rentals, Inc. agreed to 
construct the restaurant and also agreed that it would be 
built in accordance with plans and specifications provided 
by Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant. (Exh. 10-P, 1791 -
1792) 
d. On July 1, 1977, respondent and the Malstroms 
executed the addendum to the lease sued upon as above-
mentioned. (Exhibit B to Complaint) 
e. On December 1, 1977, Malstroms leased to Price 
Rentals, Inc. the property on which respondent's theater 
was located and also the property upon which the Perkins' 
Cake & Steak Restaurant was constructed. The agreement 
provided that Price Rentals, Inc. took the property subject 
to respondent's lease and in effect, sold Malstroms' lease 
rights to Price Rentals, Inc. (Exh. 7-P, 1789 - 1790) John 
Price guaranteed the performance of Price Rentals, Inc. on 
the lease. 
5. Appellant's Violation of Respondent's Lease Over 
Respondent's Protest and After Notice by Respond-
ent of its Lease Rights 
By reason of Malstrom's lease to appellant of the 
property covering respondent's leased property of December 1, 
1976, (which was subject to respondent's lease and was in 
effect a sale of same to Price Rentals, Inc.) (Exh. 7-P) 
7 
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Price Rentals, Inc. became subject to all of the obliga-
tions of the lease sued upon by respondent, and it is so 
stated in Exhibit 7-P. Thereafter, appellant did the follow-
ing acts in willful violation of respondent's lease. 
(Exhibit 1-P) 
In the middle of summer of 1977, respondent's pres-
ident, E. Glen Koplin, noticed some markings placed on 
asphalt that the Chantel Theatre used in its parking. He 
asked the man in charge, Marvin Dobkins (Price Rentals, Inc. 
employee) why he had marked Penelko's parking. Dobkins 
responded that he represented the Price industries that 
were leasing the theater to Penelko. Dobkins showed 
Koplin a plan that left the Chantel Theatre with just a 
fraction of its parking and was also advised that there 
was going to be a driveway over the parking and there wasn't 
going to be a theater sign there, that Price owned the 
property and was going to redesign it. Koplin responded 
that Penelko, Inc. had a lease on the property "and you 
can't do that". Koplin also mentioned that the theater's 
two lights didn't seem to be on the plans, and Dobkin 
advised they will be removed also, but he would check into 
it. 
In August, 1977, respondent's Director, Carley Koplin, 
and her attorney, Nolan Olsen, met with Jack Kerbs, Price 
Rentals, Inc. contractor for construction of the Perkins' 
R 
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Cake and Steak Restaurant. Kerbs was advised that construc-
tion of the restaurant was infringing on respondent's 
parking rights as lessee of the property. (1950 - 1951) 
In the latter part of August, 1977, appellant cut off 
the electricity to the theater sign so that the lights did 
not show and also two of the three parking lights respondent 
had installed. For two months the theater was in total 
darkness. (2449 - 2450, 1968 - 1969) 
The Perkins' Cake and Steak Restaurant was completed 
in or about the first of November, 1977. After the restau-
rant proper was constructed, appellant Price Rentals, Inc. 
did the following additional wrongful acts in violation of 
respondent's lease. 
Jack Kerbs, Inc., employed by Price Rentals, Inc. to 
construct the restaurant (Exh. 11-P) ran a 35 foot roadway 
through the parking lot and re-striped the parking showing 
no parking permitted on the west side of the restaurant. 
Kerbs also build an island, landscaped, erected a 
flagpole over the parking space and removed two of Penelko's 
parking lights. Price Rentals, Inc. also tore down Penelko, 
Inc. 's Chantel Theatre marquee on November 4, 1977. This 
was ordered by Marvin Dobkins, Price Rentals, Inc. employee 
who was directed by Price Rentals, Inc. Vice President, Rex 
Frazier. (1728 - 1733, 1801 - 1823, 2135 - 2145, Exh. 3-P) 
The Chantel Theatre marquee was torn down in the pre-
sence of and over the verbal protests of respondent's 
Directors, Carley Koplin and Lavona Peterson. (1953 - 1959, 
9 
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Exhs. 45-P, 46-P, 47-P) 
Construction of the restaurant complete with landscap-
ing, tearing down Penelko's sign, and erection of the 
restaurant sign, was completed on or about November 4, 1977, 
and the restaurant opened for business November 7, 1977. 
( 144) 
The construction of the Perkins' Cake and Steak Rest-
aurant proper was also a willful violation of Penelko's 
lease. 
The Perkins' Cake and Steak Restaurant adjoined the 
Penelko leased premises on the south. Respondent's lease, 
paragraph 7, provided that 
all parking facilities . . . upon the leased pre-
mises are to be used in common with other occupants 
of property of the lessors, 
and that 
The lessor shall provide in leases of adjoining 
property similar covenants and agreements so that 
the lessee shall have similar, unobstructed access 
to parking, lighting and other common facilities 
of adjoining tenants. (our emphasis) 
Neither Malstrom's Offer to Lease (Exh 8-P), Lease 
Agreement between Malstroms and Price Rentals, Inc. (Exh. 
7-P) or Price Rentals, Inc. Lease to Perkins' Cake & Steak 
Restaurant (Exh. 10-P) had any such or similar covenant. 
Price Rentals' lease to the restaurant provided "that the 
shopping center shall contain a minimum of 400 parking 
spaces, . " (paragraph 24, Exh. 10-P) 
But the use of parking spaces of the shopping center 
was contingent upon the formation of a merchants' association 
10 
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and the promulgations of rules based on agreements provided 
for use of such common parkina. No merchants' association 
was ever formed. 
The court will have noticed that Price Rentals, Inc. 's 
lease with Perkins' Cake and Steak Restaurant providing for 
construction of the restaurant was dated December 20, 1976, 
which was about a year earlier than Malstroms lease to Price 
Rentals, Inc. of the property on which the restaurant was 
located (December 1, 1977). (Exh. 10-P, 7-P) The only con-
tract Price Rentals, Inc. produced providing any right of 
appellant to construct the restaurant was the "Offer to 
Lease". It can be inferred that appellant in the action did 
not produce all writings it was requested to produce, for as 
is mentioned above, John Price, President of Price Rentals, 
Inc. was claiming ownership of Penelko lease as early as 
January, 1975. Even the "Offer to Lease" was dated March 25, 
1977. 
Further, appellant so constructed the Perkins' Cake 
and Steak Restaurant that it did not and could not provide 
parking for Chantel Theatre customers. 
Perkins' Cake and Steak property on which the restau-
rant was built was approximately 73 feet by 155 feet. The 
restaurant itself substantially covered such property so that 
the only parking provided was 4 to 5 to 7 spaces at the rear 
(north) of the restaurant for restaurant employees. (1730, 
1987, 2168, Exh. 69-P, 2038 - 2039) Appellant provided no 
document showing their rights to any other parking spaces, 
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although subpoenaed to do so. (2212) Sandy City, in its CUP 
permit, required that the restaurant construct 24 parking 
spaces, but it did not do so. (Exhs. 22-P, 24-P, 2167) 
6. Mitigation of Damages. 
Appellant, after tearing down the Chantel Theatre 
marquee in an attempt to mitigate damages, installed a 
portable roll-about sign. This was totally useless. The 
children changed letters around, knocked it to the ground, 
and people could not see it when they were driving by the 
theater. (1985 - 1987) Regarding this sign, appellant's 
expert witness, David C. Edwards, testified "I said I 
wouldn't have it in front of my business. I wouldn't take 
the time to put it out there." (2438) 
He also testified, "I would say that the portable 
sign would deteriorate the theater." (2439) 
Later, Al Jackson, a representative of appellant, pro-
posed a sign on the Chantel Theatre. He showed director 
Carley Koplin a proposed drawing of the proposed sign. The 
proposed sign would not have had much benefit becuase it 
was too far from the road. Respondent's director, Carley 
Koplin did approve appellant putting up the sign, but so 
that there was no question that it did not take the place 
of the sign that was torn down, wrote on the approval: 
Penelko, Inc. will accept this sign as an effort 
of sorts to mitigate damages to the corporation. 
It does not meet Penelko's specifications and not 
to be accepted as a sole marquee. 
Appellants did not install the proposed sign on the 
top of the theater. (Exh. 55-P, 1970 - 1974) 
12 
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Penelko has never refused any request of Price Rentals, 
Inc. to install any sign in an attempt to mitigate damages. 
(1974) 
At about the time that Price Rentals, Inc. tore down 
the Chantel Theatre marquee, respondent's directors, Carley 
Koplin and LaVona Peterson asked Edward P. James, Planning 
Director for Sandy City whether they could replace the Chantel 
Theatre sign at another location. He replied there was "no 
way" they could have another sign and further that they (Sandy 
City) deal only with the owners of the property, and in this 
case, it was the Malstroms. (1964, 2181 - 2184, 1874 - 1878, 
1869 - 1870, 1976 - 1882) 
7. Respondent's Damages. 
Before the construction of the Perkins' Cake and Steak 
Restaurant and the landscaping and roadway over respondent's 
leased parking spaces, respondent had at lease 50 parking 
spaces. Chantel Theatre patrons had no parking problems. 
(2170 - 2171) After the construction, there were some 24 
spaces left. (1725, 1966 - 1968) 
After Perkins' Cake and Steak restaurant opened for 
business on November 7, 1977, (when appellant had torn down 
respondent's sign and disconnected two of its parking lights, 
landscaped and built road) respondent's customers had little 
or no parking space. Perkins' Cake and Steak Restaurant, 
having build no parking space of its own and constructed its 
entrance adjacent to respondent's leased parking space, the 
restaurant's patrons took over respondent's leased parking 
13 
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place. Employees of respondent would park off the space in 
the dirt to at least leave some place for patrons to park. 
(2170 - 2171) There was little or no parking available. Some 
days all of it was gone. Some days 10 or more spaces would 
be left. On the road it would always look like the parking 
was completely taken. (1736) The Chantel Theatre's evening 
show commenced at 7:00 p.m. and the restaurant was open 24 
hours a day. During the evening shows, the parking was com-
pletely taken over. (1735, 1966 - 1968) 
Appellant's theater witness David K. Edwards (who 
visited the theater on the last Saturday in April, 1979) 
testified that he wouldn't have known there was a theater 
there if he hadn't made a survey to find it, that he wouldn't 
go into the theater if he was a customer because it didn't 
look like a theater. (2445 - 2446) 
Before appellant's willful breach of respondent's 
lease (as above mentioned) the revenue and net income of the 
Chantel Theatre climbed steadily. After said violations of 
the lease, consummating in the opening of the Perkins' Cake 
and Steak Restaurant November 7, 1977, the revenue and net 
income plunged. 
The testimony of respondent's C. P. A. John Gidney, 
together with his exhibits show this. 
Based on Exh. 40-P and 41-P (documents showing all 
revenues and all expenses of the Chantel Theatre and including 
income tax returns) Exh. 39-P, 42-P were received in evidence. 
Pages 1, 2, and 3 of respondent's Exh. 39-P show a steady 
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climb in revenue from the theater's operation in June, 1973 
and the plunge in revenue after appellant's violation of 
respondent's lease. For example, that year's six-month 
revenue for the year 1973 was $27,463.90, and for the year 
1976 was $68,099.93. (pages 1 and 2, Exh. 39-P) 
After appellant's violation of respondent's lease in 
November, 1977, the revenue for 1978 plunged to $27,776.10. 
(See page 2 of Exh. 39-P) The graph on page 3 of Exh. 39-P 
graphically shows this rise and plunge of revenue. 
Page 4 of Exh. 39-P shows the rise and fall of net 
income for the years 1974 through 1978 which are 4 years of 
operation. This page of the exhibit shows a continual 
increase of net income of the theater from 1974 through 
1976. Then after Price Rentals' violation of Penelko's 
lease, it shows a sharp decline in net income for 1977 
through 1978. 
Exh. 39-P originally contained a page 5 (which was 
made Exh. 43-P). This page contained a mathematical projec-
tion of what the income would have been had the Chantel 
Theatre's growth in profits continued on the lease which re-
flected a loss of net income for the remaining 35 years of 
the lease of some $777,000. However, the jury had the facts 
and figures on this mathematical projection and consequently 
they could draw inferences. Thus, the jury could have 
brought in a verdict of damages of some ten times the $65,000 
verdict they did bring in. (1904 - 1910) 
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Exh. 42-P prepared by witness Gidney depicts by graph 
basically the information contained in Exh. 39-P and graphic-
ally depicts the steady rise in income until the appellant's 
violation of respondent's lease when the revenue plunged. 
(See Gidney's testimony commencing on 1885) 
Gidney further testified that his exhibits showing 
what the net income could have been had it not been for the 
sudden plunge in net income after appellant's violation of the 
lease was substantially consistent with respondent's copies 
of the United States tax return for the years 1973 through 
1977. (Exh. 44-P) Gidney testified that his exhibits cor-
rectly reflected the tax returns, when he eliminated income 
tax factors which did not reflect the actual net income from 
the operation of the theater. For example, the depreciation 
of improvements on real property is fixed by cost and is not 
actual market value. (1938, 1934 and 2024) 
Appellant's witness Duane Liddell, a C.P.A. and his ex-
hibits collaberated Gidney's evidence in every respect. It 
showed, as did Gidney's evidence, that before appellant vio-
lated respondent's lease, there was a continual rise in 
revenue which dramatically decreased after the violations. 
(2423 - 2424, Exh. 94-D) 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
Answering Appellant's Point I That the Judgment 
Against Appellant Should be Reversed Because of 
the Trial Court's Error in Denying Appellant's 
Motions for a Directed Verdict. 
Under this heading (pages 14 to 16) appellant attacks 
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the jury's verdict 
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Actually, the jury's verdict was woefully inadequate. 
The evidence would have supported a verdict of over $700,000. 
The factual basis for the jury's verdict is set forth 
above in MATERIAL FACTS OF THE CASE and, particularly, Sub-
section 7 of same "Respondent's Damages". (page 13 supra) 
Respecting the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the $65,000 verdict are the following facts. 
Respondent's theater was not a new venture when appel-
lant willfully and wrongfully violated respondent's lease in 
1977. The theater had been operating since 1973. Consequently, 
it had prior experience upon which to base a claim for loss 
of future profits it would have made but for appellant's 
tortious acts; namely, constructing improvements over respond-
ent's leased parking place, tearing down respondent's theater 
marquee, disconnecting two of respondent's parking lights, 
and usurping respondent's parking by constructing the Perkins' 
Cake and Steak Restaurant without any parking for its customers 
so that it took over respondent's allotted parking after 
November 7, 1977 when the restaurant opened for business. 
These tortious breaches of respondent's lease were 
calculated, deliberate, and were done with full knowledge of 
respondent's lease. 
Appellant's acts resulted in the decline of respond-
ent's profits and created the uncertainty of what future 
profits respondent would have made had it not been for these 
acts in breach of respondent's lease. 
The evidence shows that before appellant's breach of 
respondent's lease, respondent's net income from the theater 
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climbed steadily. That after said violations consummating in 
the opening of the Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant on Novem-
ber 7, 1977, the revenue income plunged. John Gidney's 
testimony and his Exhibits 39-P and 42-P show this as stated 
in "7. Respondent's Damages" above. 
As a convenience to the court, we attach hereto as an 
appendix a copy of Exhibit 39-P. 
By mathematical computation and/or inference, had this 
upward climb of profits contineud until the 35 years remaining 
of respondent's lease, the loss of profit would have amounted 
to $777,000. (See Exhibt 32-P, which was originally page 5 
of Exh. 39-P. The court did not allow this page in evidence 
but it was merely a mathematical computation.) Further, as 
stated above, the evidence of appellant's witness, Duane 
Lidden, CPA, corroberated Gidney's evidence in every respect. 
The authorities appear uniform in holding that (where 
as here) the party's business is not a new venture but has 
prior experience upon which to base a claim for future 
damages, damages for loss of future profits should be awarded 
despite the fact that they cannot in the nature of them be 
fixed with exact certainty. And further, that the wrong-doer 
(appellant herein) cannot complain as his wrongful acts 
created the uncertainty. 
Security Development Co. v. Fedco, Inc., 22 Utah 2d, 
462 P2d 706 (1960), involved an action for lost profits for 
violation of a lease, resulting in loss of floor space. The 
court pointed out that in Fedco plaintiff was engaged in a 
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new business venture and had no prior experience upon which to 
base a claim for loss of future profits. But plaintiff had 
claimed damages during the period it had occupied the premises, 
and the court ruled that these damages were not to be denied 
simply because they could not be ascertained with exactness, 
stating: "Damages are not to be denied because they cannot 
be ascertained with exactness." 
Regarding the prerogative of the jury to draw infer-
ences from the evidence presented, the court quoted from 
Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653, 66 S.Ct. 740, 744, 90 
L.Ed. 916 (1945): 
It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict 
involved speculation and conjecture. Whenever 
facts are in dispute or the evidence is such that 
fair-minded men may draw different inferences, a 
measure of speculation and conjecture is required 
on the part of those whose duty it is to settle 
the dispute by choosing what seems to them to be 
the most reasonable inference. Only when there is 
a complete absence of probative facts to support 
the conclusion reached does a reversible error 
appear. But where, as here, there is an eviden-
tiary basis for the jury's verdict, the jury is 
free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are 
inconsistent with its conclusion. And the appel-
late court's function is exhausted when that 
evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being 
immaterial that the court might draw a contrary 
inference or feel that another conclusion is more 
reasonable. 
In Freeway Park Bldg., Inc. v. Western States Wh. Sup., 
22 Utah 2d 266, 451 P2d 778 (1969), where plaintiff was wrong-
fully evicted from the premises) again the plaintiff had not 
been in operation long enough to have a history of profit to 
figure loss of future profits. Nevertheless, regarding 
defendant's contention that the loss of profits could not be 
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fixed with exactness and, therefore, there was uncertainty in 
the evidence, the court stated: 
There is evidence to the effect that the 
tenants had made a profit durinq the five 
months immediately preceding the attachment 
amounting to approximately $15,000. The 
records were not complete, and a certified 
public accountant doing the best he could with 
what he had calculated the gross sales for the 
five-month period to be $136,000 and the net 
profit as stated above ... 
In this case concrete data was given in 
evidence; and while the records were not suffi-
cient to give the exact prior earnings, we think 
they were sufficient to enable the jury to infer 
the amount of damages, if any, which were occa-
sioned by reason of the wrongful attachment and 
eviction, and thus to give a just verdict in the 
case. See McCormick on Damages, Hornbeck Series, 
Sec. 229. 
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 237 U.S. 251, 
90 L.Ed. 652 (1946) states the rule as follows: 
Nevertheless, we held that the jury could return 
a verdict for the plaintiffs, even though damages 
could not be measured with the exactness which 
would otherwise have been possible. In such a 
case, even where the defendant by his own wrong 
has prevented a more precise computation, the 
jury may not render a verdict based on specula-
tion or guesswork. But the jury may make a just 
and reasonable estimate of the damage based on 
relevant data, and render its verdict accordingly. 
In such circumstances "juries are allowed to act 
on probable and inferential as well as upon 
direct and positive proof" . 
It would be an inducement to make wrongdoing so 
effective and complete in every case as to pre-
clude any recovery, by rendering the measure of 
damages uncertain. Failure to apply it would 
mean that the more grievous the wrong done, the 
less likelihood there would be of a recovery. 
The most elementary conceptions of justice 
and public policy require that the wrongdoer . 
shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his 
own wrong has created. 
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The constant tendency of the courts is to 
find some way in which damages can be awarded 
where a.w7ong has been done, and difficulty in 
ascertaining the damages is not to be confused 
with the riaht of recovery for a proven invasion 
of the plaintiff's rights. 
See also Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper 
Co., 282 U.S. 555, 75 L.Ed. 544.(1931), in which it is stated 
as follows: 
Where the tort itself is of such a nature 
as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount 
of damages with certainty, it would be a perver-
sion of fundamental principles of justice to deny 
all relief to the injured person, and thereby 
relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for 
his acts. In such case, while the damages may 
not be determined by mere speculation or guess, 
it will be enough if the evidence show that the 
extent of the damages is a matter of just and 
reasonable inference, although the result be only 
approximate. The wrongdoer is not entitled to 
complain that they cannot be measured with the 
exactness and precision that would be possible 
if the case, which he alone is responsible for 
making, were otherwise ... As the supreme 
court of Michigan has forcefully declared, the 
risk of the uncertainty should be thrown upon 
the wrongdoer instead of upon the injured party. 
Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542, 550-556. 
Eastmen Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 
U.S. 359, 71 L.Ed. 684 (1927), (the classic decision), states 
the rule as follows: 
"Damages are not rendered uncertain because they 
cannot be calculated with absolute exactness. It 
is sufficient if a reasonable basis for computation 
is afforded, although the result be only approxi-
mate." This, we think, was a correct statement 
of the applicable rules of law. Furthermore, a 
defendant whose wronqful conduct has rendered 
difficult the ascertainment of the precise damages 
suffered by the plaintiff, is not entit~ed to 
complain that they cannot be measured with ~e 
same exactness and precision as would otherwise 
be possible. Hetzel v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 169 
U.S. 26, 39, 42 L.Ed. 648, 562, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
255. And see Lincoln v. Orthwein, 57 c.c.A. 540, 
120 Fed. 880, 886. 
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See also Jacksonville Blow Pipe Co. (5th Cir.), 264 
F2d 717 (1959); Wyoming Wool Marketing Assoc. v. Woodruff, 
372 P2d 174, 3 ALR3d 802 (1962); and Reed v. Williams, (Ark.) 
445 s.w. 90 (1969). 
II. Answering Appellant's Point II. That the Court 
Erred in Application of the Law to the Facts of 
the Present Case. 
Respondent believes what it has said above completely 
answers appellant's Point II. Under this argument on pages 
21 through 23, appellant contends that the court failed to 
properly instruct the jury on proximate cause re damages. 
Even had this been the case, the error would not have been 
prejudicial. For the evidence was sufficient to support a 
finding that appellant's willful and wrongful acts did, with-
out question, cause respondent's lost profits. 
As is pointed out above, before appellant's violation of 
respondent's lease, respondent had no parking problems. But 
after appellant had landscaped and built a roadway over 
respondent's parking space and after appellant had torn down 
the Penelko Theatre sign and disconnected two of its lights, 
and after the Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant was opened on 
November 7, 1977, there was little or no parking available 
for Penelko's theater customers. Some days, all of the park-
ing was gone. Appellant's theater witness testified if he 
hadn't made a survey to find a theater, he wouldn't have 
found it because it didn't look like a theater, and if he were 
a customer, he wouldn't go into it. (See page 14 supra) 
However, the court did properly instruct the jury re 
proximate cause and dawages. In Instruction No. 21, the court 
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If you ~ind the issues in favor of plaintiff 
a~d against the defendants, or either of them, it 
will be ~our duty to award the plaintiff such 
damage, if any, as you may find from a preponder-
ance of the ev~de~ce will fairly ar.d adequately 
compensate plaintiff for any injury, and the dam-
ages therefor, as defined in these instructions 
which plaintiff has sustained as a consequence ~f 
any wrongful conduct of defendants, or either of 
them. ( 120 5) 
Further, the jury was instructed, 
Such damages must be certain both in their 
nature and as to the cause from which they pro-
ceed. They must be directly and necessarily 
occasioned by the lessor's wrongful act and must 
have been reasonably within the minds of the par-
ties at the time of the lease. (Instruction 22, 
1206) 
The error in the court's instructions was against Pen-
elko, Inc. For examples: 
In instruction No. 15 the court instructed the jury 
that the plaintiff's rights under the lease to use parking 
areas, install signs and lights were still subject to the 
rights of the lessors, first the Malstroms and then Price 
Rentals, Inc., to develop an integrated shopping center. 
(1198) But no integrated shopping center was ever authorized 
under the lease and no merchants' association was ever formed. 
(see paragraph 6 of respondent's lease) 
In instruction No. 20 the court instructed the jury that 
in determining whether any act done by defendant was wrongful, 
the jury should consider whether such acts were reasonably 
intended to further the purpose of developing an integrated 
shopping center. But as stated above, the very least parking 
rights plaintiff had under paragraphs 3 and 7 of its lease 
(whether or not a shopping center had been formed) was to use 
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the parking in conunon with the adjoining tenant, Perkins 1 Cake 
& Steak. Price Rentals, Inc. by landscaping over the parking 
place, building a roadway on it, striping it for no parking 
and erecting a flagpole prevented such use by plaintiff. 
Price Rentals contends on pages 21 and 22 of its brief 
that much of testimony of witness John Brown was permitted to 
go to the jury permitting it to speculate on the <larnage to 
Penelko's leasehold. 
Mr. Brown was an independent real estate appraiser 
with outstanding qualifications. He was familiar with the 
leased property and theater. He examined it many times, and 
was an expert in appraising theaters. (2040 - 2042, 2044 -
2049, 2058) Mr. Brown's proposed testimony was to show the 
value of Penelko's leasehold before Price Rentals' violation 
of the lease and after the violation of the lease. 
The court refused to permit one iota of opinion testi-
mony of Mr. Brown on the value of Penelko's leasehold. 
For examples: 
The court sustained Price Rentals' objection as to the 
best use of the property. (2050) 
It sustained Price Rentals' objection as to economic 
rent. ( 2052, 2053) 
The court sustained Price Rentals' objection as to the 
value of the leasehold interest. (2054) 
It sustained Price Rentals' objection as to the present 
worth of the lease prior to November 4, 1978. (2066) 
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It sustained Price Rentals' objection as to whether the 
parking lots were empty the 10 or 12 times Brown visited the 
premises. 
The court sustained Price Rentals' objection of the value 
of the lease. (2079 - 2082) 
The court stated it would not question Brown's qualifi-
cations. (2098) 
But the court ruled it was not willing to rule that 
Brown's testimony presents a fair measure of damages and could 
not see that Brown's testimony consisted of a proper measure 
of damages. (2099 - 2101) 
These errors of the lower court on instructions and re-
fusal to admit expert testimony were prejudicial errors. 
But respondent does not seek the reversal for new trial 
on these errors except should the court rule that the evidence 
was not sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict of $65,000. 
Respondent does not want the expense involved in a new trial. 
III. Answering Appellant's Point III. That the Court 
Erred When it Refused to Permit the Introduction 
of Evidence That was Relevant and ~.aterial to 
Vital Defenses Raised by Appellant. 
Appellant's arguments under Point III. appear to be that 
respondent refused to let appellant erect theater signs that 
would have mitigated respondent's damages. 
That is not correct. For as is pointed out above, resp-
ondent permitted appellant to erect any sign it desired. 
Appellant did install a roll-about sign that was worse than 
useless. But appellant declined to install a sign on top of 
the theater when Director Carley Koplin would not agree that it 
would replace the marquee torn down. 
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Appellant's statement at page 23 of its brief of the 
testimony of Bernard Reynolds, Sandy City Planner, that the 
city would have permitted relocation of plaintiff's sign is 
misleading to say the least. Reynolds was not Sandy City 
Planner at the time respondent's marquee was torn down. He 
did not know the regulations at that time, and his testimony 
was not unequivocable. 
Mr. Reynolds was not employed by Sandy City when the 
C.U.P. permit was issued providing that Penelko, Inc. must 
provide 24 parking spaces. He testified that if the property 
on which Price Rentals landscaped, built a roadway and erected 
a flagpole were on separate parcels of property, then there 
could be separate signs. But that leases were not within the 
ordinances and had no relevance; that the whole area was owned 
by the Malstroms. Further, that the restaurant sign had no 
right to be installed where it was unless on a separate parcel. 
That Price Rentals had no right to install the restaurant sign 
unless the theater sign came down. 
2322, 2362, 2327) 
( 2161, 2162 f 2167 I 2321, 
Penelko' s theater marquee was already erected on the par· 
eel, therefore, Price Rentals, Inc. tore it down. 
The planning director handling this matter at the time 
was Edward P. James. And as is pointed out above, respondent's 
directors, Carley Koplin and Lavona Peterson approached James 
on putting up another sign, an c James replied, "No way", and 
that he only dealt with the owner of the property, which in 
this case was the Malstroms. (page 13 supra) 
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Appellant's proposal to erect a double sign involved an 
agreement with the Norge Village Cleaners. The cleaners' pro-
perty was not owned or controlled by Penelko. It was property 
adjacent to appellant on its west boundary. 
Price Rentals' contention on page 24 of its brief that 
the court rejected evidence of its proposal to erect a double 
sign with the cleaners is misleading to say the least. 
On the morning Price Rentals tore down Penelko's theater 
marquee, November 3, 1977, Penelko's director, Carley Koplin, 
had a telephone conversation with Marv Dobkins speaking for 
Price Rentals. He proposed taking the Chantel Theatre sign 
down and adding a dual sign with the cleaning company. She 
advised that she could not consent to it until she had a meet-
ing with the corporation's other directors. She went to the 
site of the theater with director LaVona Peterson. Price 
Rentals, Inc. tore down the sign while they were there. (1951 -
1959) 
Appellant did not put up such sign, and after Perkins' 
Cake & Steak opened its business and usurped respondent's 
parking place it would hardly have mitigated damages. Respond-
ent permitted appellant any sign it wanted, to mitigate damages. 
But the only sign appellant erected was the useless "roll-
about" sign. 
On page 30 of its brief, Penelko argues that the court 
erred in not permitting it to cross-examine director Carley 
Koplin on the contents of Penelko's intermediate appeal prepared 
by Penelko's attorney, William H. Henderson. This argument is 
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obviously without merit. (See Petition in Supreme Court) 
There is no such admission. 
IV. Answering Appellant's Point IV. That Appellant 
is Entitled to a Reversal of the Judgment Because 
of the Court's Prejudicial Statements Durino the 
Trial. 
The trial court was not guilty of misconduct, and appel-
lant's accusation of same is frivolous. 
On pages 34 and 35 of appellant's brief, appellant com-
plains because the court, in overruling an objection of appel-
lent' s counsel, stated that the lawsuit arises because of the 
fact that the roadway landscaping was constructed on parking 
area leased to the Penelko theater. Paragraph 3 and 7 of 
the lease provides, at the very least, that Penelko have the 
right to use its leased parking places in common with adjoin-
ing lessees. Thus, the very least Penelko had under this 
lease was the right to use the space in common with Perkins' 
Cake & Steak Restaurant. Thus, a roadway and landscaping over 
this leased space prevented its use in common by appellant, 
and this, among other things, is what this lawsuit was about. 
It can hardly be misconduct of the trial judge to tell a jury 
what the lawsuit is about. 
The other claim of misconduct of the trial judge was his 
statement quoted on page 37 of appellant's brief that neither 
Sandy City, John Price, or Price Rentals had any right to 
allocate to the restaurant as its parking stalls any parking 
space on the respondent's leased land and had no right to 
authorize construction on respondent's leased parking space. 
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This also was a correct statement of the law. Obviously, John 
Price, John Doe, Sandy City, or any one else had no right to 
alter respondent's rights under its lease. 
DATED: July _jl__, 1980 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARK S. MINER 
Newhouse Building, Suite 525 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 363-1449 
WILLIAM H. HENDERSON 
431 South Third East, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served two copies of the fore-
going Respondent's Brief by mailing the same, postage prepaid, 
to the office of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 700 Continental 
Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, this / / rA day of 
July, 1980. 
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SU!·C-L\RY OF SALES 
(C,\Sll fl\S I~;) 
JUNE 1973 THROIJGl! ~!ARCH 1979 
Tick"t Concession 
Sales Sales 
$ 1,12!;.:JO $ 401. :,3 
3,310.25 1,118.23 
3,633.00 1,291.38 
2 '402. 50 1,001.85 
3,470.00 1,595.66 
3'1,1,3. 7 5 1,381.66 
---.I-'. 3J r~. ]_~ __ 9'll,. r,~ 
$ 19,719.00 $ 7 '7i14. 90 











l 923.50 738.69 
$ 39,788.00 $ 15, 748. 96 
$ 3,00Ci.00 $ 1,359.77 
4 '7 2 7. so 1,866.85 








3,013.50 1, 243. 1,3 
1,856.00 631. 16 
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------ --- ---~ 
Tick'-' t Concession Total Month and Year Sales Sales Sales 
January 1976 $ 3 '738. 00 $ 1,4811.48 5,222.48 February 2' 730. 50 1,205.59 3,936.09 ;1arch 5,439. 75 2,026.54 7,466.29 April 5,09J.25 1,587.50 6,680.75 May 2,299.50 826.24 3,125.74 June 6,124.50 1,941. 75 8,066.25 July 6'111. 00 1,887.12 7,998.12 August 3,569.00 1,268.66 4,837.66 September 4,322.50 1,462.73 5,785.23 October 4 ,871. 75 1,525.24 6,396.99 Nove!:!ber 4,292.00 1,429.54 5,721.54 Dececber 2,110.50 752.29 2,862.79 
TOTAL 1976 $ 50,702.25 $ 17,397.68 68,099.93 
January 1977 $ 3,654.00 $ 1,232. 77 4,886.77 
February 2,253.50 659.61 2,913.11 
March 3,5J7.00 l,129.10 4,666.10 
April 2 ,Sl18. 25 1,024.99 ),873.24 
nay 4,010.00 l,1;89.77 5,499. 77 
June 2,%1.50 l,068.70 4,030.20 
July 2,751.50 1,066.87 3,818.37 
August 3,947.00 1,315.40 5,262.40 
September 2,655.50 931.87 3,587.37 
October 2,8(>9.50 1,219.40 4,088.90 
Novecber 2,295. 75 777.25 3 ,073.00 
December 8116.50 329.85 1,176.35 
TOTAL 1977 34,630.00 $ 12,245.58 $ 46,875.58 
January 1978 $ 1,520.00 $ 547.70 $ 2,067.70 
February 1,1115. 50 527.20 1,942.70 
March 1, QI, 7. 00 401. 7 5 1,448. 75 
April 1,5110.00 6711.57 2,214.57 
Nay 2,31'.i.OO 874.90 3,189.90 
June 1,732.00 668.10 2,400.10 
July 1,937.!10 690.88 2,627.88 
August 2,476.00 815.85 3,291.85 
Septel!lber 1,740.50 720. 30 2,460.80 
October 1,755.50 570.40 2,325.90 
November 1,525.50 496.05 2,021.55 
December 1,415.50 368.90 1,784.40 
TOTAL 1978 $ 20,419.50 $ 7,356.60 $ 27,776.10 
January 1979 $ 4,332.00 $ 1,600.77 $ 5,932.77 
February 2,362.50 959.70 3,322.20 
March 1,421.50 616.35 2,037.85 
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-I >IJ.ES 
Sales $ 1icket 
concession Sales 
Less Sales Tax 
TOTAL SALES $ 
(l)S'l OF SALES 
~ $ 
~ncessions Costs 
TOTAL COST OF SALES $ 







hpairs & ~aintenance 
Office Supplies 
Legal & Accounting 
Contributions 
Property Taxes 
TJxes & Licenses 
TOTAL ORDINARY 
OPERATING EXPENSES* $ 
CASH AVAILABLE 




197~ - 1978 
1974 1975 
39,788.00 $ 1.~.~07.00 
l'.i,7!13.96 17, 1,o<J. 80 
(2,216.91) (2,978.51) 
53,320.05 s 56,938.29 
13,377.36 $ 13,705.96 
9' 350.11 10' ]21,. 79 
22,727.47 $ 29,030.75 
30,592.58 s 27,907.54 









33.31 3511. 89 
11,365.76 $ 12,J4l1.85 
19,226.81_ $ 15,562.69 
I 
i 
1976 1977 1978 
$ :.0,102.25 0 311,630.00 ,. $ 20,419. 
17,397.68 12,245.58 7,356 .. 
(2,835.97) (1,918.46) (1,800.: 
$ 65,263.96 $ 44,957.12 $ 25,975.: 
$ 21,544.42 $ 14,018.33 $ 8, 728.( 
8,311. 78 6,198.58 4,274.: 
s 29,856.20 $ 20,216. 91 $ 13!002.: 
$ 35,407. 76 $ 24,740.21 $ 12,972.S 
$ 2 ,98l. 34 $ 2. 350. l'• $ 1,508.1 
2,438.07 2,787.41 2,842.7 i 
5,369.76 2. 886. 8 i 
696. 78 1,837.88 
700.55 120. 78 
1, :::·2 ~ 
15.31 17.66 133.1 
205.00 205.00 185.0 
---
2,537.52 2. 531. 02 ---
397.85 453.85 35.0 
s 9,972.42 $ 15, 723.50 $ 8,914.1 
$ 25,1.35.34 $ 9,016.71 $ 4,058.7· 
~epreciation is not included, as all cash outlay for building and equipment was in 1973. 
-- ••All loans are scheduled,for 1980 payoff - then <Jvailaole cash would go to stockholders. 
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